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Abstract 
In this paper we provide an alternative explanation for the rise of modern management 
schools at the turn of the 20th century. We argue that these schools were not just 
responses of the higher education system to the demand of industrializing companies for 
a new class of professional managers, like Chandler suggests. Based on our historical 
research we found that the struggle for emancipation of the new professions (engineers 
and accountants) was the main driver for the founding of these schools. Management 
schools were viewed as the main vehicles to raise the social status of these new 
professions. 
To legitimize their position in the higher education system, abstraction appeared to be 
the dominant strategy of the professions. By abstraction they could distinguish 
themselves from the lay public and other professional groups in the domain of 
management. 
At the moment the new professions had a foot in the higher education system the 
engineers and the accountants contested for the new management domain. Abstraction 
appeared also the successful strategy of the accountants to distinguish themselves from 
the engineers and to establish a sound base for the development of the Dutch variant of 
business economics. 
Keywords 
Business schools, management education, professions, history of business schools, 
higher education.
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Introduction 
One of the most interesting phenomena in the recent history of university systems is the 
rise of professional schools for management. Their suspect alliance with the commercial 
world, their lack of a coherent body of knowledge and their opportunistic flirting with 
science and practice have elicited waves of criticism in the course of 20th century 
(Hugstad, 1983; Cheit, 1985). Some authors even argue that business and management 
are illegitimate disciplines with a ruling philosophy which are anathema to the 
independent academic tradition of the university (see Macfarlane, 1995). In spite of this 
criticism business and management has become one of the most popular studies within 
the US and European university systems. In the US, about 90.000 students receive an 
MBA degree at 900 universities. One out of 250 American citizens have an MBA 
diploma. Exact figures about the number of graduates of business and management 
studies in Europe are lacking but in the last two decades the number of institutions that 
provide academic management education has exploded here as well. 
This paradoxal history has hardly been explained yet. Most authors have emphasized the 
demand of the industrializing companies for a highly trained class of professional 
managers. One unique and prominent alternative to this explanation is Robert R. Locke’s 
study Management and Higher Education (1989) in which he stressed the determinative 
role of traditional university cultures for explaining the variety between national 
management education systems. For example, the refusal to adopt a kind of American-
like management education model by the Germans, known as the German Obstinacy, is 
explained by the dominant Wissenschaft ideal, the zealous dedication to the pursuit of 
scientific truth through systematic research, prevented the rise of practice oriented 
business schools (Locke, 1989, 1996; Gemelli and Rodenstock, 1998). 
In this paper we shall not deny the importance of the demand from the corporate world 
or the role of university cultures, but will emphasise the actors who made things happen: 
the professions. Especially in the early phase of the development of management schools 
the professions (engineers, accountants, lawyers, economists) played a decisive role in 
shaping these new academic institutions. 
The explosive growth of and differences between national management education 
systems after World War II can only be understood against the background of the 
changes in the national economic and university system in the pre-war period. Or as B.R. 
Clark puts it: 
“Basic to the analysis of academic change, then, is the simple principle that existing 
structures have response sets that shape what follows” (Clark, 1983: 184). 
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This ‘response set’ was moulded in the formative period (1880-1940) of management 
schools and it strongly varied form country to country. 
In this paper we will analyse and describe the rise of management schools in the 
Netherlands before World War II. We explicitly use the term management schools (and 
not business schools) as we do not want to exclude the role of the engineering schools in 
management education. In our historical actor-based perspective we have conceptualised 
management schools as professional schools which constantly have to find a balance 
between the culture of science and the culture of practice. Although this balancing act is 
a generic trait of professional schools, the ways how this balancing act is performed by 
the relevant actors and the ways in which these schools are embedded into national 
systems of higher education vary to a large extend from country to country. 
We will first briefly describe the two dominant theoretical explanations for the rise and 
development of management schools. We then explain some of the basic dynamics of the 
concepts of the profession and professional schools that will be used in our description. 
Finally we give a detailed description of the social shaping of the early Dutch 
management schools during the first two decades of the 20th century. 
Two dominant perspectives: functional and cultural logics 
There have been only a few academic attempts to explain the rise of the modern 
management schools at an international and national level. Looking at these studies one 
can distinguish two fundamentally different approaches. The first is the so-called 
functionalist or culture-free approach, which assumes that (external) imperatives of 
economic and technological nature determine the evolution of a national system of 
management education in a uni-linear way. As these imperatives are prompted by the 
inherent drive for efficiency, national management education systems converge with 
respect to structure and content. One of the first and well known representatives of this 
culture-free perspective is the study of Harbison and Myers, Management in the 
Industrial World (1959). The authors contended that there is a ‘logic of industrialism’ 
which “leads to the same end-point-industrialism, the concept of a fully industrialized 
society, which is characterized by a number of common basic economic and social 
structural features” (see for discussion about the convergence thesis: Lane, 1989: 21). 
Modern versions of culture-free theories are the contingency approaches that became 
popular in the 1960s and 1970s and the ‘structure-follows-strategy’-approach of Alfred 
D. Chandler in the 1980s and 1990s. Chandler explains the rise of business schools at the 
turn of the 20th century as part of a broader process of professionalisation of management 
within the new multiunit business enterprises (Chandler, 1977: 466). The emergence of 
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these educational institutions is explained in terms of a response to “the expansion in the 
size and complexities of managerial hierarchies” at that time. 
Culture-free approaches do not neglect cultural and social factors that play a role in the 
development of business schools but they put them into a functional, inevitable and uni-
causal relationship. To put it in Chandler’s words:  
”Cultural and social differences also may have played a role in delaying the coming of 
the large managerial enterprise and with it managerial capitalism.” (Chandler, 1977: 
376).  
Chandler does not claim that there is just one (American) route for education systems to 
managerial capitalism. However what Chandler does suggest is that education systems 
can only be adaptive and responsive and not causal to a certain economic development. 
Many authors have criticized the culture-free approach to management education in 
relation to economic development (Mosson, 1965, Levine and Kawada, 1980, Handy 
e.a., 1989). In his seminal work Management and Higher Education Robert Locke 
(1989) has critiqued this culture-free approach by pointing at the great differences 
between several European management education systems caused by the differences in 
university traditions (‘heritages’): 
“This means that the acceptance of business studies in each country depended on the 
ability of that country’s culture to foster and to assimilate it. And it also means that 
the form and the effectiveness of business studies will be, because cultures vary, 
different in each country.” (Locke, 1989: 54). 
Locke aims at dealing with the specificity of educational evolution that can shed light on 
the relationship between business studies and economic performance (Locke, 1989: 55). 
In his view national educational heritages that are formed in the course of the 19th 
century explain the differences between countries in national management education 
systems. Although we sympathize with Locke’s culture-specific approach, he takes a 
rather static perspective on educational heritage. The question that rises is whether this 
educational heritage can determine educational patterns in a uni-causal way over a long 
period of time. Can we really delineate current national management education patterns 
from a once established educational heritage? We doubt this is possible. Modern modern 
schools are neither just a response to the rise of managerial hierarchies nor are they just 
products of cultural heritages in education systems. In this paper we therefore will 
advance a more dynamic perspective on the evolution of management education within 
management schools that pays attention to economic and cultural factors as well as to 
relevant actors involved. Our theoretical perspective is inspired by Berger and 
Luckman’s theory of social construction (1976) and Giddens’ structuration theory 
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(1984). Both theories acknowledge that actors cannot escape from the institutional 
environment when they are acting but they are also cognisant of the fact that this 
institutional environment is socially constructed and that it changes as a consequence of 
these actions. In our historical actor-based perspective we will show how this worked 
out. 
Management Schools as Professional Schools 
Our main argument here is that the rise of management schools (its form and its 
educational content) cannot be understood by its functions (e.g. creating a class of 
professional managers) but should be explained by the motives of the actors that were 
involved in the founding of these schools within the broader context of the 
modernization of higher education systems since the second half of the 19th century. The 
rise and development of professional schools are viewed pivotal in this modernization 
process (Jarausch, 1982). To make this point clear we discuss some basic concepts of the 
process of the forming of professional schools. 
Professional training took place within the universities since the Middle Ages but was 
pushed outside by liberal education and pure research. Only the old professions (clergy, 
lawyers, doctors and academic professor) survived in pre-modern higher education 
systems by increasing their scientific character. The new professions (engineers, 
chemists, economists, accountants etc.), that began to emancipate during the second half 
of the 19th century, viewed higher education not only as the adequate place to develop 
and transfer the professional expertise but also to elevate the social status and to facilitate 
legitimization of the new profession in society. To understand the importance of the 
professional school for the new professions more deeply we first have to define the 
concept of profession. 
Professions and professional tactics 
What is a profession? From the extensive literature on professions we learn that it 
appears hard to find a generic set of attributes that allows us to characterize the great 
variety of (old and new) professions. To define a profession we therefore follow 
Abbott’s minimal and loose descriptioni: 
“…professions are exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract 
knowledge to particular cases.” (Abbott, 1988: 8) 
In Abbott’s view controlling their body of knowledge and skills is the defining criterion 
for professions that distinguish them from other occupational groups. Any occupation 
can obtain licensure or develop ethical codes but only the knowledge system can (re-) 
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define its problems and tasks and can defend them against intruders from other 
occupational domains or lay people (Abbott, 1988: 9). Incomprehensibility, like Layton 
(1986: 4) argues, to the laymen (and to other professions) is the foundation for 
professionalism. The more abstract the profession can develop its knowledge system the 
harder it becomes for laymen and other professions to penetrate the professional domain. 
Abstraction therefore enables the survival in the competitive system of profession 
(Abbott, 1988: 9). Reference to a ‘system of professions’ is important here. It implies 
that the development of one profession pre-empts the development of others. If, for 
example, one profession claims a piece of the knowledge domain of management, it will 
evoke boundary conflicts with other professions in this field. Or as Abbott puts it: 
“…knowledge is the currency of competition” (Abbott, 1988: 98). 
Especially for the new professions, that often lack formal recognition by the state, the 
knowledge domain is subject to attacks from other older or new emerging professions. 
One important defense mechanism that will be discussed in this paper is reduction. By 
reducing a particular complex phenomenon to its essence, a profession can claim this 
belonging to its ‘field of jurisdiction’. Abbott gives the example of child misbehaviour 
that is reduced to the disease of hyperactivity and therefore can be claimed by the 
medical profession that it belongs to its field of jurisdiction.  
In the old, functionalist sociology of professions (e.g. Parsons, 1939), professions were 
viewed as rather homogeneous and stable occupational groups with common values. The 
later sociology of professions has pointed to the instable and dynamic character of the 
profession as a collective actor (Bucher and Straus, 1961; Mok, 1973). Professions are 
constantly subject to internal dissension and conflict which may lead to segmentations 
within the profession or even to the forming of a new profession.  
This implies that the profession not only should be very alert to domain claims from 
outside (by laymen and other professions) but also to the internal instability caused by 
conflicts and controversies.  
The Paradox of Abstraction 
The power of abstraction (i.c. reduction) not only lies in the defending of a professional 
knowledge domain but also in its potential for expansion. This is based on the notion that 
the diffusibility of knowledge increases with the increase of formalization (i.e. reduction) 
of knowledge (Boisot, 1995, 1998).ii It implies that formalized professional knowledge 
can be applied to a wide variety of jurisdictional fields. Reduction is often a redefinition 
of another profession’s field of jurisdiction to its own. However, as Abbott argues, there 
are limits to expansion. As the knowledge become too abstract and general, and therefore 
become disconnected from actual practice, jurisdiction attenuates. Abbott distinguishes 
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two types of abstraction: generalized and specialized formalization. In the former form 
abstraction emphasizes mere lack of content: the abstract knowledge refers to many 
subjects interchangeably (e.g. the medical model). The latter form emphasizes positive 
formalism: abstract knowledge is focussed on a limited subject area (e.g. the physics 
model). This type of abstraction strengthens jurisdiction, especially when it is 
accompanied with effective treatment (a set of professional methods and instruments that 
mediates between the abstract knowledge and the concrete work of the professional). 
The generalized type of extreme abstraction (lacking content) appears to be more 
problematic. It is hard to have effective treatments for a great variety of work practices. 
When treatments are disconnected from abstractions, the knowledge base of the 
profession is simply a set of generalizations without legitimacy. Such a situation makes 
the field of jurisdiction vulnerable to attacks from competing professions and intrusion 
from the lay public. 
So, in general, the more the professional knowledge is formalized, the better the 
profession is able to exclude competing professions and the lay public from the field of 
jurisdiction.iii On the other hand, the more particular knowledge is “lifted out of its 
context” (Giddens, 1990), the harder it becomes to find an adequate set of methods and 
instruments to apply this knowledge into a particular context. This trade-off mechanism 
in the profession concept is called the Paradox of Abstraction, which suggests that 
professions, in order to control a particular field of jurisdiction, need to find an optimal 
level of abstraction (Halpern, 1992: 996). 
The Balancing Act of the Professional School 
The centrality of abstract knowledge in the profession concept elucidates the important 
role the professional school plays in the institutionalization of a profession. It has to 
provide the profession with knowledge that is abstract enough to defend the field of 
jurisdiction against competing professions and easy access of the lay public. On the other 
hand it has to take care that the knowledge will not become disconnected from the 
professional work. This balancing act is characteristic of the history of professional 
schools. 
This structural ambiguity of the professional school (Light, 1982: 346) becomes even 
more manifest at the moment these schools are adopted in the university system. As 
Whitley (1988) has pointed out, in university systems the profession is confronted with 
two conflicting reputation systems. Within the university reputation system people are 
expected to work on the advancement of disciplinary knowledge and are rewarded for 
their publishing in scientific journals and participation in the scientific community. 
Within the reputation system of practice, people are judged for their contribution to the 
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solution of practical problems, for their competence to apply knowledge in effective and 
efficient ways, and their commitment to organizational goals. 
These two reputation systems within the professional school rises the question what 
should be the mission of the school: to what extent are they to train practitioners and to 
what extent are they to educate pure disciples of the profession’s core knowledge? 
(Light, 1982: 346). This duality leads to a hybrid mission of the professional school. 
In most cases, professional schools are not able to deal adequately with this hybrid 
mission. As Wagner and Wittrock (1991b: 333) argue, schools choose either for a 
scientisation strategy or for a professionalisation strategy. In first strategy the focus is on 
the development of a closed, formal ‘self-referential’ discourse. Relevant actors see the 
academic institutions primarily as research oriented. Education at these institutions 
should primarily be focussed at preparing young people for scientific careers. In the 
second strategy schools aim at the formation of a vocational group to which the training 
is devoted. Relevant actors view these institutions more as training- and education-
oriented. 
Professional schools also play another important role: social status transfer. At the end 
of the 19th century the new professions were attracted by the universalistic rhetoric of 
science, which could legitimate their professional work and guarantee their elite class 
position in society. As we will discuss later this pursuit for academic recognition 
coalesced but also conflicted with the demand for highly educated manpower in the 
modernizing industry. 
Other stakeholders 
It is important to note here that the shaping of the professional school was not solely left 
to the profession. It was subject to the dynamics of the interactive triangle, composed of 
the profession, the state and the clients (i.c. the business world) (Burrage, Jarausch and 
Siegrist, 1990: 207). The role of the state can be twofold: formal recognition of the 
school by legislation and educational policy regulation. Of course, the state also had an 
important role in founding the professional school. Professional schools were viewed as 
a main vehicle for providing the industrializing society with advanced, scientific 
knowledge and a highly trained corporate elite. The state also sponsored the founding of 
professional schools (esp. engineering schools) in order to erect barriers to what Disco 
(1990: 33) calls the fear of colonization by foreign or foreign-trained experts. 
The other important stakeholder in the interactive triangle are the clients, in our case the 
business world. As the economic and commercial domain within the industrializing 
companies became more complex the traditional, expensive and time-consuming ways of 
training and socializing (on-the-job training, business site tours etc.) of young 
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management talent began to fall short. University-based professional schools could 
provide the prospective employers with uniformly trained, competent and loyal 
graduates (Disco, 1990: 32). A theoretical habitus was deemed desirable because it 
invested graduates with cognitive authority and flexibility within the commercial and 
economic domain that was becoming more complex (Disco, 1990: 32-33). 
Representatives of the business world (e.g. chambers of commerce, employer 
organizations) will regularly express their concerns and educational wants to the 
professional schools and the state. If possible they will try to influence the curricula of 
the professional school, which may lead to conflicts with the academic value system. A 
well-known protest against the influence the business world on academia was voiced by 
Thorstein Veblen (1918) in his pamphlet Higher Learning in America. Here he defended 
the eternal goal of the university “to conserve and extend the domain of knowledge” 
against the emerging vocationalism and “incursion of pecuniary ideals” in academic 
education. Requests from the business world to educational institutions are often 
paradoxal. On the one hand they demand for critical and scientific trained graduates, 
while on the other hand they expect them to be loyal to the employer and to be not too 
specialistic.  
What makes this interactive triangle very dynamic is that the relevant actors participate 
in different and sometimes overlapping social systems (Whittington, 1992). For example, 
the chairman of a chamber of commerce who is also engaged in the board of a 
professional engineering association. 
The lack of a professional model for general management 
There have been numerous attempts to define management as a profession. 
Unfortunately, these attempts have not been very successful. The lack of an established 
body of theory makes academic management studies, and therefore management as a 
profession, of an easy prey to its critics from academia and from practice. The question 
then rises to what extent Abbott’s theory about the system of professions can be applied 
to management schools? 
Probably the most important notion that can be drawn from Abbott’s theory is that 
management (business administration) lacks a dominant professional model. In most 
cases professions have dominant cultural model (dominant ideas), which more or less 
govern and control the field of jurisdiction. For example, in the engineering profession, 
although split up in many segments, the technological nature of the task area determines 
the dominant ideas and activities of the profession. The lack of a dominant professional 
model has resulted in what Whitley (1988) has called an “ad-hocracy”, consisting of a 
variety of sub-fields which differ considerably in their degree of task uncertainty and of 
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task coordination. Taking management as a whole he characterizes it as fragmented, 
being proliferated of diffuse and unconnected intellectual standards, goals and 
techniques and multiple interpretations of research results (Whitley, 1988: 342-343).  
Within management schools the two before mentioned abstraction strategies are at work. 
Specialized formalization takes place within the functional fields of management, 
whereas generalized formalization occurs within the area of general management. Some 
functional fields within management, like accountancy and operation research, have 
been, depending on the nature of the professional field, more successful in their 
abstraction strategy than others (human resource management, strategy, and to an 
increasing extent information management). All these sub fields attempt, departing from 
the professional core, to imperialise to the general management domain by reducing 
management essentially as e.g. a marketing, human resource management, information 
processing problem. Therefore, general management is the most problematic and 
vulnerable area within the management field as it claims an abstract, distinguishable 
body of knowledge. General management is an unconnected set of formalizations 
without effective treatments that can mediate between the abstract body of knowledge 
and the actual work of managers. One of the consequences of the absence of a dominant 
professional model is that professionals (within the university and practice) feel free to 
avoid engaging in direct debate and conflict with colleagues from different sub fields. 
This ad-hocracy precludes a cumulative development of a professional body of 
knowledge of management. 
Professional Schools and Academic Cultures 
At the moment that the first US and European business schools were founded, the idea of 
establishing a scientific field of management (a discipline) was quite detached from the 
ideas of educating a new class of professional managers. Academic education meant 
general education. Therefore, the typical 19th century debate on academic education was 
not about scientific versus vocational education, but about general versus vocational 
education. When the modernization of European and American universities took off, 
general education was gradually substituted by scientific education. 
When Joseph Wharton offered the trustees of University of Pennsylvania $100.000 to 
organize a “School of Finance and Economy”, he deliberately had chosen for the liberal 
arts college of the university “to create a liberally educated class of leaders for American 
society” (Sass, 1982: 20). Wharton phrased the object of his initiative as follows: 
“To provide for young men special means of training and of correct instruction in 
the knowledge and in the arts of modern Finance and Economy, both public and 
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private, in order that, being well informed and free from delusions upon these 
important subjects, they either serve the community skilfully as well as faithfully in 
offices of trust, or, remaining in private life, may prudently manage their own affairs 
and aid in maintaining sound financial morality: in short, to establish means for 
imparting liberal education in all matters concerning Finance and Economy” (quoted 
in Sass, 1983: 21). 
This quest for liberal education still reflected the old 19th century idea of the power of 
general education and had less to do with the demand for high-quality professional 
training by a rising class of professional managers (“Visible Hand”), as is suggested by 
Chandler (1977). It was primarily meant to elevate the status of businessmen in society 
(Van Baalen, 1995).  
Similarly, in the Netherlands, the founding of the first academic Handelshogeschool in 
1913 should not just be viewed as first step in providing businessmen with an academic 
education, but also as the end-point of a long lasting struggle for social emancipation.  
The first curricula of the Wharton business school were primarily designed to these ends 
and consisted of courses like history, political economy, government policy etc. Only a 
few business-oriented courses were adopted.  The same holds true for the first German 
and Dutch business schools which also reflected the typical general-vocational education 
controversy in these early years (Locke, 1989; van Baalen, 1995). Redlich concludes that 
by 1900 a sound foundation for high-class professional training, like in medicine, law, 
and theology, was lacking (Redlich, 1957: 58). The main reason was that commercial 
and business topics had not been subject to scientific attention. Here Locke observes that 
there was “no matter of scientific nature to teach in a commercial school (…), it still had 
to be created” (Locke, 1989: 71).  
The lack of a body of knowledge at the US business schools 
Outside the universities the first ideas about the development of a separate body of 
knowledge for management were launched. In his address The Engineer as an Economist 
to the annual meeting of The American Society of Mechanical Engineers in 1886 Henry 
R. Towne, one of the pioneers in scientific management, promoted the idea of 
empirically building up body of knowledge for management: 
“A vast amount of accumulated experience in the art of workshop management 
already exists, but there is no record of it available to the world in general, and each 
old enterprise is managed more or less in its own way, receiving little benefit from the 
parallel experience of other enterprises (…) according to the alibility of its managers, 
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receiving little benefit or aid from all that may have been done previously by other in 
precisely the same field of work” (Towne, 1886). 
Since then this call for a common body of knowledge for management has been repeated 
many times by other pioneers of scientific management. Frederick W. Taylor advocated 
the development of a “true science”, based on research where “every trifle - there is 
nothing too small - becomes subject of experiment” (Taylor, 1911). Based on detailed 
research to the actual work of employees in the workshop, universal laws for 
management could be developed and ‘rules of thumb’ should be ruled out. In France, 
Henry Fayol urged his audience that it was “quite time to codify the data furnished by 
experience and place a body of theory within reach of all (Fayol, 1963). The ideas of 
these prewar pioneers in scientific management breathed the positivist thinking of 
August Comte who believed that the aim of social science was to unravel universal laws 
in society, like the laws in natural and physical sciences, by codifying observable social 
facts. 
As Merkle (1980: 71) points out, there was a strong fascination with higher education 
from the side of the early scientific management pioneers. Getting their ideas accepted in 
the ‘ivory towers’ was seen as the establishment of their success. It would provide the 
Taylorites with certification which enabled them to formalize and monopolize 
management skills in industrial corporations (Merkle, 1980: 73). Taylor himself 
explicitly explained that higher education should not aim at liberal education but feed 
manpower into industry (Merkle, 1980: 72). 
The professors’ resistance to the introduction of scientific management studies in 
universities, could not prevent them from becoming very popular courses at the business 
schools and the engineering schools.  
In spite of the call for an integrative body of knowledge that was built on detailed 
research and collection of experiences no such a theory was developed. Both, Taylor’s 
and Fayol’s descriptions of management functions were normative, managerial 
ideologies that reflected their concern for industrial chaos and conflict and less of 
empirically tested ‘laws of management’ (Guillén, 1994: 43). 
In the 1920s American management thinking gradually turned away from the mechanical 
and empirical view of scientific management (Daniel, 1998: 97). In the new thinking 
about management the human factor in business was emphasized, which resulted in a 
more ‘society-based conception of business’. Or as Daniel (1998) puts it: 
(…) the change here (at the several business schools. PvB, LK), was so widespread it 
must have reflected at least the beginnings of attitude shift, from the controlling of 
workers to an understanding of human motivation.”(Daniel, 1998: 98). 
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However this new orientation did not result into an integrative body of management 
knowledge. Consequently, a great variety of management programs developed in 
academic business schools during this formative period. During the pre-war period, the 
US business schools primarily followed professionalisation path. The curricula of the 
business schools were descriptive, strongly oriented on business practices and, reflecting 
business needs. Of crucial importance was the development of functional areas 
(marketing, finance, production etc.) alongside the strategy and structure transformations 
that occurred at huge American companies (Chandler, 1977) and the financial support 
that was given by these companies. At the graduate level this functional specialization 
started at Harvard, Amos Tuck and Michigan; at undergraduate level at Chicago, 
Columbia, and Wharton. Moreover, business school curricula witnessed an explosion of 
topics and courses in the 1920s, which resulted in confusion in course offerings. In the 
late 1920s and early 1930s a widespread dissent and criticism arose about this constant 
subdividing of management knowledge in “self-contained subjects” (Pierson, 1959: 48) 
and business schools’ intimate (financial) bonds with the world of business. 
The main problem thus was the lack of a coherent, integrative theoretical framework that 
could bind the different functional areas together. Two remarkable exceptions were 
Harvard and Chicago. In an attempt to halt this increasing specialization and vocational 
drift, Chicago tied functional areas to basic disciplines and tried to firm up the relations 
with the department of economics. The basic idea behind this so-called ‘environmental 
approach’ was that the “business manager administers under conditions imposed by his 
environment, both physical and social” (Silk, 1963: 18). Harvard’s approach was 
different, more instrumental. The school was not aiming at an integrative theory but at 
the integration of knowledge and experience through practice: the case study method. 
Dewing, one of the early historiographers of the Harvard case method, explains: 
“Education, accordingly, would consist of acquiring facility to act in the presence of 
new experience. It asks not how a man may be trained to know, but how a man may 
be trained to act. It is concerned with precedents only so far as they lead to initiatives. 
It deals with the oncoming new human experience rather than with the departing 
old.” (Dewing, 1954: 1). 
The other anti-specialization instrument, used by Harvard, was an elective course on 
Business Policy (1911-1912). It sought to approach business problems from the 
perspective of top management and to tie together the departmental courses of the first-
year program (Copeland, 1958: 43). 
However the typical response to this increasing specialization was not to work on a 
general theory of management but to restore the old Anglo-American ideal of ‘liberal 
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education’. Bossard and Dewhurst’s  (1930) influential research about American 
business schools promoted the strengthening of liberal education with a “businesslike 
disposition” and to bring down the number of narrowly focussed business courses: 
“… a broad background of general and economic knowledge, a disciplined capacity 
for independent thinking, a facility in oral and written expression, and an instinctive 
appreciation of ethical values and responsibilities should constitute the primary goals 
of professional training for business” (Bossard and Dewhurst, 1930: 222). 
Harvard responded to this call for ‘businesslike liberal education’ by inserting courses in 
Business History (1927) and Business Ethics (1928) into its curriculum. Pleadings for 
liberal education gained momentum during the years of The Great Depression. In a 
Harvard Business Review article, The failure of Business Leadership and the 
responsibility of the Universities (1933), Wallace B. Donham, dean of the Harvard 
Business School, criticized the failure of business and political leadership. The main 
problem was overspecialization and the lack of interest to consider actual business 
problems within their broader, societal context. Or, as Donham put it: “It is no one’s 
problem to consider things in their relations” (Donham, 1933: 419). 
In the same Harvard Business Review issue Ernest M. Hopkins commented, “in our 
colleges and universities narrow specialization has wrought grave injury.” 
Overspecialization has contributed to the will and ability for cooperative action among 
men (Hopkins, 1933: 414). Hopkins therefore pushed the notion of ‘unity as an 
educational ideal’ to be pivotal in the reform of colleges and universities. 
Looking at the development of the US business schools in this formative period they 
typically followed the professionalisation track. The management knowledge that was 
provided by the schools was fragmented into different specializations and reflected 
primarily the needs of practice. The call for a liberal education with a ‘business like 
disposition’ as a ‘recovering mechanism’ (Mittelstrass, 1987) was the typical response of 
the US business schools in the pre-war period. There were hardly any attempts to 
transform different pieces of scientific management, economics, bookkeeping, and 
accountancy into a new management (inter-) discipline. 
The pre-war developments of management studies at the business schools and the 
engineering schools in the Netherlands took quite a different track. The Dutch business 
schools gradually changed, spurred by the zealous efforts of a small group of 
accountants, from a professionalisation strategy towards a scientisation strategy. This 
resulted in the successful establishment of business economics. The Dutch engineers, on 
the other hand, were more or less forced to stick to a professionalisation strategy, which 
implied that business courses were primarily taught for the further professionalisation of 
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the engineers. We first discuss management education at the Dutch engineering school 
and than at the Handelshogeschool in Rotterdam and the Faculty of Commerce in 
Amsterdam. 
The Engineers and Management  
Around the turn of the century Dutch engineers developed a strong professional 
consciousness. Two major societal developments had contributed to this professional 
consciousness. The first was the industrialization in the Netherlands that took off in the 
late 19th century. It resulted in the spreading out of engineers over industry. The 
industrialization gave rise to the deployment of new technical domains in which 
engineers started to work. In a very short period of time industry and commerce became 
the most important occupational domains for the engineers. The rise of the engineering 
profession was accompanied by a scientific revolution in technology (Layton, 1986). In 
1879 only 6,7% of the engineers were employed in industry. In a very short period of 
time engineers invaded industrial corporations. In the period 1900-1917 the total number 
of engineers occupied in industry, shipping, and commerce increased from 312 to 1043 
(from 29,7% to 37,9% as a proportion of the total number of engineers) (Lintsen, 1980: 
190). The scaling-up and mechanization of production processes in industry were the 
most important pre-conditions for recruiting engineers for these new technical domains 
(Disco and Lintsen, 1983: 343-350). 
The second major development, what Willink (1988) has called the emergence of a civic 
scientism, emerged during the second half of the 19th century as part of a broader process 
of modernization in Dutch society.  In this emerging climate of change, a new social-
ascending middle class (Buergertum) held a positive attitude towards civic scientism:  
the modern utilitarian sciences, physics, chemistry, economics and commerce.  Reform 
of higher education was part of it. The Higher Education Act of 1876 implied a 
valediction of the traditional, class-bound education system. Within this climate of 
change the emancipation of engineering education took place. The secondary 
engineering school in Delft, the Polytechnische School (1864-1904), after a struggle 
enduring almost thirty years finally acquired university status in 1904. Like in Germany 
this upgraded Polytechnische School, from then on called the Technische Hoogeschool, 
became part of the higher education system but remained, because of the disdain in 
universities towards vocationalism, still institutionally separated from the universities. 
Notwithstanding this initially marginal position in the higher education system, the 
engineers believed, on the basis of their academic prestige and their applied scientific 
knowledge, that they could rationalize and manage the complex production system in 
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modern corporations. Disco (1974) has described this new professional consciousness of 
the engineers as follows: 
“Understanding themselves as avatars of a new age, some late 19th century and early 
20th century engineers claimed competence, (…), over a broad field which was later 
precipitate into micro-economics, management sciences, and industrial psychology 
and sociology.”(Disco, 1974: 718) 
At the same moment the engineers entered the large industrial corporations the 
profession faced a conflict between the claims of science and business that pulled 
different segments within the profession in opposite directions. The engineering school 
played a pivotal role in this conflict as the school was expected to provide the engineers 
with the right business knowledge and skills to function in commercial and management 
positions. 
In the Netherlands the first academic business courses, Bedrijfsleer, were taught since 
1905 at the Technical University of Delft. Bedrijfsleer was more or less the Dutch 
variant of the German Betriebswirtschafslehre (BWL). Bedrijfsleer was an unrestricted 
and fragmented field of commercial and industrial courses, which lacked an integrating 
formal object. It was called a Kunstleer (like in Germany) instead of a science, an 
arbitrary, loosely coupled collection of topics from scientific management and book 
keeping with a strong orientation on practice. 
These Bedrijfsleer courses were meant to provide industrial engineers with the right 
business knowledge and techniques to function adequately in managerial jobs. Equipped 
with this business knowledge the engineers would be able to compete with lawyers who 
dominated management ranks in industrial firms.iv This argument for emancipation was 
endorsed by Dutch national government, and even appeared to be the decisive argument 
for inaugurating an extraordinary chair in Bedrijfsleer and bookkeeping in 1908 (held by 
the accountant J.Ch. Volmer till 1934).  
“…only with complete knowledge of Bedrijfsleer and bookkeeping, the engineer 
would be able to take the first position in the industrial company, while without this 
knowledge he has to contend with a second, subordinate role.”(quoted in: Gosselink, 
1988: 19, translation by PvB and LK). 
In the years 1908-1925 different segments of the engineering profession hotly debated 
wheter business courses should be extended in their curricula. The motove behind the 
expansion  of business education was social not educational, for the reformers sought to 
find the lawyer’s monopoly in management’s higher ranks by the extension of business 
courses in the Technische Hoogeschool study program. 
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Table 1. Number of management engineers as percentage of total number engineers in 
period the 1885-1919 
Year Total number of engineers Engineers in management 
positions 
Percentage 
1885 550 42 7,6 
1891 786 67 8,5 
1900 1050 93 8,8 
1910 2070 220 10,6 
1917 2754 372 13,5 
Source: van der Veen, 1918 
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Table 2. Number of engineer managers and lawyer managers in big Public Limited 
Companies in 1900 and 1916 
1900 1916 Public Limited 
Companies Total Engineer 
Manager 
Lawyer 
Manager 
Total Engineer 
Manager 
Lawyer 
Manager 
Oil, lacquer, 
and paint 
factories 
6 1 - 35 3 1 
Textiles 
factories 
24 - - 61 6 - 
Breweries, meal 
factories 
26 1 1 36 4 1 
Sugar factories 
 
29 - 4 40 4 8 
Dry docks, 
shipbuilding 
yards 
10 1 - 34 10 1 
Chemical, 
Yeast, carbolic 
acid factories 
29 3 1 63 14 3 
Machine-, 
paper-, glas, 
etc. factories 
62 - 3 196 62 3 
Railways, 
tramcar 
companies 
38 16 6 78 41 4 
Gas factories 87 8 - 153 20 - 
Total 311 30 15 696 164 21 
Source: van der Veen, 1918 
 
Both tables show a rapid diffusion of management engineers in managerial ranks. Table 
2 demonstrates that the perceived lawyer monopoly, that served as one of the main 
arguments for the engineers to advocate extension of business courses in the engineering 
curricula appeared to be a myth. Industrialization took off very late (since the 1890s) in 
the Netherlands but as soon as the engineers entered business companies they 
outnumbered lawyers in managerial positions. 
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Later, the engineers used the rise of a large group of technicians, educated at the 
modernized vocational secondary technical schools into managerial jobs, as another 
argument to extend the proportion of business studies in the engineering curricula. The 
Dutch engineers felt they were squeezed between the lawyers at the top management 
level and technicians at the middle management level. This perceived tweak position 
gave the engineers a strong impetus to plea for an extension of business courses at the 
technical university.  
Technical Economics: a new engineering discipline? 
The debate over the expansion of business courses that went on in the engineering 
community, 1908-1925, exposed the paradox of abstraction. Whereas the extension of 
management courses in the engineering curricula would probably ease access to high 
managerial positions, it would devaluate the academic prestige of the schools and of the 
profession as a whole. The professional model of the engineers was based on technical 
knowledge. It was thought that mixing this up with (less scientific) business and 
economic knowledge the engineering education would end up in a “flish nor fowl”- 
model. 
Initially, the discussion focussed on the education of commercial engineers at the 
technical university. J. Kraus, former vice-chancellor of the technical university, former 
minister Waterstaat, president of the Maatschappij van Nijverheid, and member of the 
Senate, whose addresses and articles became very influential, initiated the public 
discussion. In his article The commercial side of the job of the engineer (1911) he argued 
that, unfortunately, engineers were hardly represented in boards of directors of modern 
companies. As long as they lacked knowledge and insights in economics they were 
forced to comply with subordinate positions. He therefore advocated setting up a new 
engineering program at the technical university at Delft, that prepared students for new 
type of engineering profession, Commercial Engineers.  
The Dutch industrialists, represented by the Maatschappij van Nijverheid, supported 
these requests. In their formal letters in July 1913 to the Council of Trustees of the 
university, the Maatschappij van Nijverheid wrote that the Technische Hoogeschool paid 
too little attention to the economic training of the engineers and urged for a more 
practical orientation in the curricula of the programs.v The Maatschappij feared that the 
Technische Hoogeschool drifted away from homeostasis between industry and university 
and was victimized to the scientisation strategy of the academic segment of the 
profession.  
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Similar and in accordance with Kraus’ ideas, the VDI (Vereeniging van Delftsche 
Ingenieurs) wrote a report on this issue in 1914 in which she proposed to set up a four 
year program for Commercial Engineers. 
An annoyed senate of the technical university responded irritated to this public attack by 
saying that business practices could not be learned at the university, that diminishing the 
theoretical (esp. mathematics) courses would be irresponsible, and that the Technische 
Hoogeschool did not appreciate being goaded by people and institutes from outside the 
university.vi The public discussion on the extension of business courses in the curricula 
did not have a scientific aim; they were meant to further professionalisation of the 
engineers who had to bridge technical and managerial aspects in their jobs in industrial 
firms.  
After the First World War the issue about the extension of business courses flared up 
again. It is interesting to note that there was a slight turn of phrase in the discussion. 
Instead of talking about commercial training of engineers, now the discussion was about 
the economic training of engineers. 
Several developments contributed to this new discourse. The first was the diffusion and 
popularisation of scientific management ideas after 1915, which gave Bedrijfsleer a more 
substantive body of knowledge. It contributed to the professionalisation of the 
management roles of the engineers. Moreover, scientific management emphasized the 
importance of empirical study and observation and could therefore pretend to be real 
scientific. According to Volmer, this empirical tenet of scientific management 
legitimised the position of Bedrijfsleer in academe. 
The diffusion of scientific management ideas coincided with the need for standardization 
of machine requirements, tools, and implements that were imported during the years of 
the First World War. In 1916 the Maatschappij van Nijverheid and the KIVI, the 
professional association of the Dutch engineers, founded the Foundation for 
Normalization. From then on, normalization and scientific management became more or 
less each other’s synonym. This new engineering discipline soon became 
institutionalized after the First World War. In 1920 the first management consultancy 
firm, Organisatie en Advies Bureau (OAB) was founded by scientific management 
engineer V.W. van Gogh, followed in 1925 by the Adviesbureau voor 
Bedrijfsorganisatie (AvB), by J.M. Louwerse. Within the engineering organization, 
KIVI, the Division Technology and Economics was founded in 1924, which aimed at the 
development and application of technical economics. This new engineering science 
should cover topics like, wage techniques, hygiene and economics of human labour, 
psychotechnique, employee participation, internal organization, planning and control, 
balance sheet- and cost pricing analysis, and statistics.  
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Engineering professor I.P. de Vooys was appointed as the first chairman of this new 
Division within the KIVI. De Vooys was probably the first who gave broad, 
philosophical perspective on technical economics. According to him it was a new 
engineering discipline and should be conceived as a kind of applied economics for 
engineers, a separate field of expertise, which should interface between economics and 
the classical engineering sciences.  
However, De Vooys did not view technical economics just as an interdiscipline which 
aimed at the integration of economics and engineering sciences. He was deeply 
convinced that it could work as reconciling elixir for the collision between the economic 
and technical system, for the class-struggle between labor and capital, and to give 
modern technology a more human face. According to De Vooys technical economics 
should develop as a ‘society science’ (maatschappijwetenschap), a new engineering 
science, which could provide the engineers with the right knowledge to take up their 
leading role in the modern society after the First World War. With respect to the 
education in technical economics, De Vooys defended the 19th century ideal of general 
academic education: it should not be too specialized and too practice-oriented. 
In his writings on technical economics De Vooys’ aimed at a new integrative science for 
engineers. Contrary to this integrative version of technical economics, Jan Goudriaan, 
PhD student of the De Vooys, treasurer of the new KIVI Department, and later one of the 
most prominent Dutch professors in Bedrijfsleer at the Handelshogeschool in Rotterdam 
hold a more pragmatic perspective on this new interdiscipline. In his PhD-thesis he 
defined this new technical economics as an applied science which should always start 
with a practical problem (Goudriaan, 1922). In the end, the very nature of the practical 
problem determines what knowledge from which science is needed to solve this 
problem. 
Although technical economics became institutionalised within the professional 
organization of the engineers, the engineering school distrusted it. In spite of the calls 
from practicing management engineers in the course of the 1920s and 1930s, hardly any 
changes took place in the curricula of the technical university. Like Halpern (1992: 
1006) argues, in order to achieve jurisdictional control over a particular domain, a 
professional segment needs support from established segments. In the case of the Dutch 
engineering profession, support by other segments did occur to some extend. The 
technical economic segment received support within the engineering organization, KIVI, 
but not from the academics within the engineering school. The latter feared a “patchwork 
of compromises” (Layton, 1986: 5) between business and scientific demands on the one 
hand and between technical and economic domain topics on the other hand. 
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In contrast to German engineering education, management studies could not flourish in 
the Netherlands. The dominant believe of Dutch engineering professors that non-
technical subject would harm scientific status of the education of engineers, prevented 
technical economics to mature to a new engineering interdiscipline.  
It is interesting to note that in Germany a similar debate about the coexistence of 
engineering and economic sciences in one study program had resulted in programs for 
Wirtschaftingenieure. The explaining difference for the failure of a similar program in 
the Netherlands is probably the fact that there was only one engineering school at that 
time. The consequence was that the different demands from different stakeholders were 
raised to just one school. In Germany there were many technical universities with 
different identities, which allowed for more pluriformity.vii 
The Accountants and Management 
Although the engineers failed in establishing a new management science, the Dutch 
accountants appeared to be very successful. At the end of the 1930’s they had their own 
academic discipline, called Bedrijfseconomie. (business economics). Why did 
accountants succeed where engineers failed? Several factors and developments 
contributed to the success of Bedrijfseconomie. One of the most important differences, 
compared to the engineers, was that when the accountants began to show interest in 
management issues, there was no academic institution that could resist a potential 
request for extending management studies in the curriculum. The first academic business 
school (Handelshogeschool) was founded in 1913 (Rotterdam). It and later the Faculty of 
Commerce of the University of Amsterdam (1921), and the independent (catholic) 
business school (Handelshogeschool) of Tilburg (1927), became the main vehicle for the 
scientisation of the professional domain of the accountants. 
Like the engineers, the accountants had a strong professional consciousness at the turn of 
the century, claiming they were more or less designated to clean up business companies. 
They saw themselves as “the army of the economic order” (De Accountant, 1904) and 
believed that in the near future their profession “…should occupy the highest ranks in 
society”, and that they “were prepared, “relying on their theoretical competence and 
practical experience, to accomplish any task, how difficult this might be” (De 
Accountant, 1895). The accountants wanted to distinguish themselves from ordinary 
bookkeepers and the bunglers. The important difference with the engineering profession 
was that the accountants did not strive after managerial positions in companies.viii They 
sought to play their important role in business companies as independent professionals, 
not as managers. The accountant profession at that time, not being formally recognized 
by state, could not outsiders, like bookkeepers and bunglers, from their professional 
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domain.ix The only way to control their professional domain was, what Abbott (1988: 8) 
has called, abstraction. Abstraction is the attempt of the profession to transform practical 
skills to an abstract system of knowledge. The weak position of technical economics at 
the academic level put the engineers in a backward position compared to other 
professions, especially the accountants, that began to show interest in the management 
domain. 
Bedrijfsleer and the Power of Abstraction 
Two main developments have contributed to the rise of the Dutch accountancy 
profession. First, there was the rapid growth of public limited companies during the last 
decade of the 19th century in which a formal distinction between ownership and 
management of companies was regulated. The accountants’ task was the independent 
audit of financial administration and bookkeeping of public limited companies. 
The other important development was the notorious Pincoffs-affair at the end of the 
1870s. This case was the first, large-scale financial fraud-case in the Netherlands that 
made the Dutch government and business world aware of the need of independent 
control of the bookkeeping of companies. However, like in England, the demand for 
auditing activities grew faster that the accountant profession, which forced the 
accountants to tolerate, to a certain extend, groups of bookkeepers and bunglers who 
were less educated and less certified (see for British situation: Abbott, 1988: 25). 
The first professional accountancy organization, NIVA, was founded in 1895 with the 
aim to defend the profession against charlatans. It had developed its own examination 
terms, admission rules, code of conduct etc. However the NIVA-exams did not reflect 
the high scientific terms of requirements of a modern profession. The accountancy-
exams of the NIVA aimed at a broad, general education, which could provide the 
accountants with the right knowledge that would enable them to hold high ranked 
positions in society.x 
In 1906 a small group of young accountants, led by Th. Limperg, branched off from the 
NIVA, and founded the NAV. The NAV wanted to modernize the accountancy 
profession, which implied developing strict regulations for the accountancy control 
activities and upgrading the examinations to high scientific norms. Or as Limperg put: 
Our exams should (…) be leading in the field, because we do no want stay behind, 
but higher, more scientific. (…) The terms of examination should be that high, that 
university education will be necessary”(quote of Limperg in De Vries, 1985: 124). 
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One nice example of this scientisation strategy of this group of accountants was that the 
candidate accountants had to write a kind of PhD thesis, which should be defended 
during the final exam. 
The pertinent point is that the scientisation of the knowledge domain of the accountants 
in first instance commenced outside an academic institution (see for other examples: 
Nowotny, 1991: 23-41). Probably, the NAV exams were even more scientific than those 
of the academic business school in Rotterdam. According to the first study guide the aim 
of the education of this school was “a general education for commerce”, which typically 
reflected the 19th century university ideal of education.xi 
Limperg abhorred the non-scientific nature of Bedrijfsleer, which he described as a 
“series of problematic cases in the domain of bookkeeping”. His aim was to transform 
Bedrijfsleer into a real, rigorous scientific discipline. To this end he tried to integrate 
Bedrijfsleer with bookkeeping (which was the other Kunstleer), and connected these 
both Kunstleren with general economics. This connection with general economics 
(Staatshuishoudkunde) was an issue of great concern for the accountants but also for 
some economists, which started of after World War I. In Germany this debate started a 
few years earlier.xii There general economist resisted the adoption of 
Handelsbetriebslehre in general economics, fearing that this “Unternehmungslehre” 
would harm the purity of the scientific status of their discipline (Sternheim, 1921: 12). 
The vindication for a close relationship between management studies and general 
economics was later also supported by the influential works of the British economist A. 
Marshall (Industry and Trade, 1919) and the American economist J.M. Clark (Studies in 
the Economics of Overhead Costs, 1923). 
In the Netherlands Limperg and the general economist H.W.C. Bordewijk, who showed 
great interest in the development of professional domain of the accountants, were the 
most important apologists of this connection.xiii Space prohibits here an exhaustive 
description of the way Limperg synthesized parts of bookkeeping, Bedrijfsleer, and 
general economics into a new economic discipline, Bedrijfseconomie. Central to his 
rigid intellectual framework was what he called the ‘economic motive’: a natural law 
which states that (rational) man will always strive for maximal profit. Because of this 
basic assumption Limperg was able to develop Bedrijfseconomie as a sub discipline of 
general economics; all aspects of management studies were subordinated to this basic 
assumption. From the 1930s onwards Limperg’s theories became very influential, mainly 
through his PhD students who evangelized his work in universities and practice. The full 
synthesis was only published in 1964 by his disciples. 
Limperg’s ambitions to transform Bedrijfsleer into an economic discipline, went 
concomitant with his efforts to get this discipline embedded into a ‘real’ academic 
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institution, the university of Amsterdam. In his view the Handelshogeschool in 
Rotterdam lacked a academic climate which could facilitate the exchange of ideas 
between different disciplines. In this climate of a Handelshogeschool “pure scientific 
education”, which was needed for a maturing of Bedrijfseconomie as a science, was 
impossible. The Faculty of Commerce was founded in 1921. Practical courses like 
bookkeeping, technology- and language courses were left out, and general economics 
was a compulsory subject. In the course of the years a further scientisation of this new 
faculty took place, which was symbolized by the change in name in 1935 from Faculty 
of Commerce Faculty to Economic Sciences. 
Business economics: a contested discipline 
Although Limperg’s ideas were very influential in the Netherlands for a long time, they 
were not undisputed. By making Bedrijfseconomie a sub discipline of general economics 
that needed to be taught within a ‘real’ academic institution, he offended both the 
engineers and the professors at the Handelshogeschool in Rotterdam. 
Domain conflicts between accountants and engineers 
Neither the accountants nor the engineers could at that time legitimately claim that 
management belonged to their professional field of jurisdiction. The domain lay fallow, 
open to be conquered by the new professions. During the years 1915-1940 the 
accountants and engineers moved to this new domain and claimed dominance over it.  
As discussed before, the engineers wished to enter this field mainly for social status 
motivations. However, since the diffusion of scientific management in the Netherlands 
after 1915, engineers also began to work as efficiency-engineers, later management 
consultants. One of the first and most influential books, Cost Pricing and Administrative 
Factory Organzation (1909), in this field was written an engineer, K.G. Simon, which 
forced the engineer’s way to enter the economic domain. Efficiency, in the end, was an 
economic issue, which moved the engineers into the area of business economics. By 
using the efficiency metaphor, the scientific management engineer sought to legitimate 
their entrance in the management domain. They believed it was their task to save costs 
by using the new scientific management techniques. 
Similarly, the accountants, traditionally dealing with control and administrative matters, 
became aware that technical, administrative and organizational issues were closely 
interrelated. To have a complete understanding of all those issues within a company, 
they needed to be trained in business economics. Moreover, like the engineers, some 
accountants started to work as management consultants. Domain conflicts between the 
two professions arose especially about topics like cost pricing and organizational issues. 
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In 1918 the accountant A.E.C. Saarloos discussed the potential conflict between the two 
professions publicly in his article Engineer or Accountant.xiv The author indicated that 
both professions were intruded into each other’s domain. He consensually promoted the 
idea of a division of labour and a close cooperation between engineers and accountants. 
However most accountants appeared to be less consensus-oriented. In general they were 
of the opinion that engineers were dabblers and were working, on the basis of their 
‘unscientific’ scientific management techniques, in an area which they did not 
understand.xv Limperg (1965), followed by other accountants, suggested a professional 
hierarchy for the management domain. Because of their defective economic and 
administrative training the engineers should confine themselves to the pure technical 
aspects of an organization. The accountants on the other hand, could, because of their 
education in (business) economics, legitimately claim the first position as advisers to 
boards of directors. They were able to oversee and integrate all management issues in 
their right, economic perspective. The engineer’s role should be subordinate, and support 
the synthesizing work of the accountants. 
In 1923, the ONRI, the professional organization of consultancy engineers, and the 
NIVA discussed the fundaments for cooperation between the two professions. Both 
organizations agreed upon a beaconing of their domain and a close cooperation. 
However, this agreement appeared to be void, no concrete actions were initiated to 
regulate the professional management domain. Rhetorical claims from both sides 
characterized the tenuous relationships between the engineers and the accountants until 
the breakout of World War II. 
It’s hard to determine which profession was most successful in the management domain. 
In the discussion between accountants and engineer the claim of the former appeared to 
be much more aggressive and arrogant. Engineers more or less avoided the dominant 
claims of the accountants. At least in one respect they had lost this professional domain 
conflict: they were not able to develop their own management discipline. The abstraction 
strategy of the accountants proved to be successful. By connecting general economics to 
Bedrijfsleer the accountants were able to set the directions of this new academic 
discipline for a long time. 
The origins of segmentation in the profession of Business Economists 
The second conflict was about the nature of the new discipline. The professors at the 
Handelshogeschool in Rotterdam differed fundamentally with their colleagues in 
Amsterdam about the character of this business science. In Amsterdam, Limperg had 
built an original, theoretical framework, especially by integrating his Replacement Value 
Theory (vervangingswaarde theorie) with a full-fledged theory of the internal 
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organization of the firm. According to Limperg this latter theory was the only and best 
method for determining cost prices and profit. In his view business economics was a 
prescriptive, deductive science, which provided guidelines for managers, accountants, 
and consultants in practice. 
The professors in Rotterdam operated pragmatically and inductive. Their thinking was 
influenced by the work of Marshall and Clark. Especially Clark’s ninth chapter 
“Different costs for different purposes” in his book Studies in the Economics of 
Overhead Costs (1923) reflects succinctly the leading motto in the epistemological view 
on research and education in business economics in Rotterdam. Here the professors did 
not reject Limpergs Replacement Value Theory. Depending on the firm’s objectives, 
different concepts and different theories should be used. 
The most prominent representative of this view was J. Goudriaan who was appointed as 
a professor in Bedrijfsleer in 1926 in Rotterdam. His earlier views on technical 
economics were reflected in his ideas about Bedrijfsleer and later Bedrijfseconomie. 
According to Goudriaan business economics was an inductive, descriptive science and 
was in fact just a ‘methodological exposé’. Goudriaan promoted an interdisciplinary 
applied science, without a dominant perspective from economics, which does not aim at 
full integration of the different sub disciplines. In his view, business economics should 
have an utilitarian and pragmatic orientation, directed towards concrete problem solving. 
These two different perspectives on the nature of business economics became the two 
leading schools of thought in the Netherlands for decades. Different perspectives on the 
epistemology of business economics reflected the differences in the institutional settings. 
The independent Handelshogeschool in Rotterdam was founded by young businessmen 
with an explicit mission to serve the regional business community. In Amsterdam the 
school was embedded in the traditional university structure. To survive in this traditional 
academic climate the new business economists had to comply with the norms and values 
of the university. 
 
Institutional transformation 
The differences between the epistemologies of the Rotterdam and the Amsterdam school 
should be relativized to some extent considering the modernization and scientisation of 
the Dutch university system in general. In the first place both schools transformed from 
practice-oriented commercial schools into schools of (business) economic science. 
Bedrijfsleer, initially a rather arbitrary collection of courses tailored to business needs, 
transformed into business economics, a sub-discipline of economics. The length of study 
changed from a two-year program (Rotterdam) into a full academic program (six years) 
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with bachelors (‘kandidaats-‘), masters, and doctorate degrees. In this respect there is 
much similarity between the Dutch and German situation in the institutionalization 
pattern of early management studies. Locke has phrased this as follows: 
“No discipline in a German university could have any ambition other than a scientific 
status.” (Locke, 1989: 134). 
Underlying the pressure to conform to emerging scientific culture of the Dutch university 
system was what Locke has called the Prestigedifferenz. However it should be noted that 
this Prestigedifferenz had different origins and motives. On the one hand it was inspired 
by the disdain of the professors at the traditional universities. Engineers and business 
economists aspired to be accepted members in the scientific community. On the other 
hand, scientisation was part of the professional strategy to survive in  the management 
domain. Perceived differences in social and occupational status between engineers, 
technicians at the middle management level, accountants, bookkeepers and bunglers 
pushed management studies in this scientific direction. 
Finally, the question arises, did this new supply of graduates in management studies 
meet the demand of the corporate world? Representatives of the business community 
intensively involved in the start-up of the engineering school, the Handelshogescholen 
(Rotterdam and Tilburg), and the Faculty of Commerce (Amsterdam). In the course of 
this formative period their involvement diminished for two different reasons. 
The first reason was the scientisation strategy of the schools that was in at the moment 
these schools were adopted into the higher education system. The schools became more 
autonomous and dissociated from the world of practice. 
The second reason was these professional schools became increasingly attractive for 
large numbers of examinees from the modern, utilitarian Higher Burgherschools (HBS). 
These schools were meant to provide the industry and commerce sectors with qualified 
personnel, educated in the modern (in contrast to the classical gymnasia) sciences 
(mathematics, physics, chemistry, commercial law, bookkeeping, geography etc.). 
However, larger numbers of the examinees did not seek for a job in industry or 
commerce but matriculated in higher education studies. At that time the government 
complained about the fact the HBS-examinees invaded higher education that was 
reserved customarily for those who held a gymnasium diploma. 
In the 1920s and 1930s these schools faced serious problems to adequately assimilate the 
massive influx of matriculants. As a consequence, the professional schools soon became 
overpopulated and the supply for graduates exceeded the demand by public and private 
organizations. An influential report of the Commission Limburg about the 
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overpopulation at the institutions of higher education concluded in 1936 “a serious 
overproduction of intellectual labourers was emerging” (Rapport, 1936: 597). 
At the same time, the demand for graduates of the professional schools was decreasing 
because of the economic depression.  Only a relative small portion (30-40%) of the 
graduates of the business and engineering schools were employed in business companies. 
The expanding governmental bureaucracy took in about one third of these graduates for 
civil servant jobs.  
Our latter remarks on macro labour market developments and changes of the national 
system of education serve to put the development of the early management schools into 
the broader context of the modernization of society. It also demonstrates that 
functionalist explanations, like we described in the first sections of this paper, 
oversimplified the relationship between the economic and education system. Or as 
Levine and Kawada have put it: 
“…education, training, and allocation of human resources in the process of modern 
economic growth constitute a set of highly dynamic arrangements. These reflect  a 
variety of political, social, cultural, technological, and economic influences that make 
it unlikely that education and skill at any given time will closely match economic 
achievement.”(Levine and Kawada, 1980: 2) 
Conclusions and Epilogues 
In their recent book “Gravy Training” (1998) Stuart Crainer and Des Dearlove gave a 
poignant picture of the inside of America’s and European leading business schools. In 
this paper we have looked alternatively from the outside to the inside of the early 
management schools in the Netherlands. The rise of these schools did not take place in 
splendid isolation.  The “Handelhochschulbewegung” (business school movement) 
(Bücher, 1925: 446-468) was an international movement that took place in the US and in 
Europe. Engineering schools and management schools were pioneering in the 
modernization process of national higher education system on both sides of the Atlantic. 
At the macro level these developments may look very similar, moving towards a 
convergence of higher educational systems. However, as we have showed in this paper, 
at the institutional level there appears to be much variety between and even within these 
systems. By looking at the actors (and their motivations) in relation to the different 
management schools we have been able to clarify the causes of institutional variety in 
management education. For example we saw how the route for management education 
for engineers was cut off by engineering professors within the engineering school and by 
the abstraction strategy of the accountants. We see the consequences even now of this 
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contest for the management domain that took place in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century. This very reputable engineering school is still weak in academic 
management education and has been surpassed in this respect by the new engineering 
schools that were founded in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Our historical actor-based approach introduced a new element in the theories that have 
attempted to explain the rise of management schools: the emancipation of the new 
professions. The engineering profession suffered because of the collision between the 
two professional models: the technical and economic model. The two models are 
incommensurable, to the extent that they cannot be reduced to a common denominator. 
Because of this collision of professional models, the accountants were able to follow 
their abstraction strategy and could more or less monopolise the management domain 
within the university structure. This monopolisation implied exclusion of the engineers 
from this academic domain of management studies. At the work floor level the 
management engineers still appeared to be very influential. Especially when the human 
relations movement began to develop in the 1930s, the management engineers were very 
enthusiastic in evangelising this new corporate gospel. Where the accountants and 
business economists theoretically struggled about how to integrate the ‘human factor’ in 
their rigid (business-) economic theories, the management engineers could easily adopt 
these new insights into their consulting practices. For the business economists there was 
no way back. Locked-in into their scientisation strategy, they were unable to respond to 
the multidisciplinary management problems raised by Dutch multinationals after the 
Second World War. They were academically trained specialists in a corporate world that 
called for ‘despecialisation’ in the 1950s and multidisciplinarity in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Business economics had become an ‘academic tribe’ (Becher, 1990), respected in the 
academic world, and increasingly disrespected in the world of business. In the end they 
were unable to escape the Paradox of Abstraction, as they had to allow the founding of 
new schools for interdisciplinary, practice oriented business administration in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Since the late 1990s these latter schools have outnumbered business 
economics in the inflow of students. 
We briefly traced out the development of the business schools in the US. Compared to 
the Dutch situation we concluded that in the US the schools mainly stuck to a 
professionalisation strategy whereas in Holland the schools switched from a 
professionalisation towards scientisation strategy. It is interesting to notice that after 
World War II many Dutch business economists showed an enormous enthusiasm for the 
reputation and performance of the US business schools. Within the framework of the 
Marshall Aid (1948-1953) and later the European Productivity Agency (1953) many 
Dutch professors in business economics visited US business schools and wrote reports 
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about how to implement parts of the US curricula and pedagogues in Dutch initial and 
post-initial university programs (van Baalen, 1995). Before World War II the leading 
professors in business economics (Limperg, Goudriaan) ostentatiously disdained the 
low-level, practice-oriented programs of the US business schools. They especially 
deemed the case study method, hailed after the World War II in Europe, to be an 
incoherent, empiricist, vulgar pedagogical method (Limperg, 1979, Goudriaan, 1947). 
This climate of change in the institutional environment, fostered by American influences, 
enabled the engineers, dissatisfied business economists, new emerging professions as the 
business psychologists and business sociologists, and representatives of the corporate 
world to break in into the closed academic management domain of the business 
economists and to put new claims on it. New schools for business education were set up 
as ‘telic institutions’ (Thompson Klein, 1990) that paved the way for interdisciplinary 
management education.  
These new practice- and problem-based management studies can be viewed as an anti-
abstraction response to the specialised closed discipline of business economics. At the 
same time they sought to professionalise the general management function per sé by 
abstracting from the practice of management. New theories for general management, like 
the decision-, game-, behavioural-, and general systems theories were introduced and 
developed to construct a science of management waiting to be confronted with a new 
paradox of abstraction in the late 1980s and early 1990s.xvi 
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Notes 
                                                     
i The following paragraphs in which elaborate on the profession concepts is mainly based on 
Abbott’s work of 1988. 
ii Boisot states: “Abstraction, in effect, is a form of reductionism; it works by letting the few stand for 
the many” (Boisot, 1998: 50). 
iii In his well known article “The professionalisation of Everyone?” Wilensky (1964) put this dilemma 
forward pregnantly: “The lay public cannot recognize the need for special competence in an era 
where everyone is “expert”. “(Wilensky, 1964: 145) 
iv General economics were institutionally embedded in law faculties of universities. Because of their 
knowledge of economics and law, law graduates were very attractive for fast growing companies. Due 
to the founding of the handelshogescholen in Rotterdam and Tilburg and the commercial faculty in 
Amsterdam economic science was able to emancipate from the law faculties. 
v ARA, TH-Delft, 1841-1956, inv. Nr. Brief van het Hoofdbestuur der Maatschappij der Nijverheid. 
Aan het College van Curatoren det Technische Hoogeschool Delft, 5 juli 1913 
vi ARA, TH-Delft, 1841-1956, inv,nr. 705. Brief van de Senaat van den Technische Hoogeschool 
Delft. Bericht op schrijven van 7 juli 1913, no. 978. Betreffende opmerkingen van de Maatschappij 
van Nijverheid nopens de studie aan de Technische Hoogeschool, 16 maart 1914 
vii Still German engineers were also leery of business studies. Wirtschaft-ingenieure programs 
appeared only in a few Technische Hochschule, notably Berlin. 
viii With this respect the Dutch accountancy profession differed from their British counterpart where 
many accountant used their profession as an entry to high managerial jobs (see e.g. Ch. Handy, C. 
Gordon, I. Gow, C. Randlesome, Making Managers. London, 1988, pp. 8) 
ix Formal recognition by the state was regulated by the “Wet op Registeraccountants” in 1962 
x It is important to note that at that time most accountants only had attended primary education 
followed up with secondary education level courses in accountancy. General education was still 
viewed as characteristic for the elites in society. 
xi Studieplan 1913-1914 en reglementen, Nederlandsche Handels-Hoogeschool 
xii In 1911 bookkeeping theorist J.F. Schär discussed this connection as follows: “Nationalökonomie 
und Handelsbetriebslehre sind also nicht nur verwandt, sondern zusammengehörige 
Forschungsgebiete; beide haben das Wirtschaftsleben der Menschen zu erforschen, die eine 
Wissenschaft nur mehr nach seinem organischen Ineinander greifen, die andere mehr nach dem 
Einzeldasein der einzelen Ineinandergreifen (…).” In: J.F. Schär, Algemeine Handelsbetriebslehre, Berlin, 
1911 
xiii A research report (1920) of the professional association of Dutch general economist (Vereniging 
voor Staatshuishoudkunde en de Statistiek) indicated that the Dutch general economists appeared to 
be enthusiastic about more practice-oriented education in general economics. Many graduates from 
law faculties, in which courses in general economics were embedded, found a job in offices of the 
national government. As the latter increasingly had to deal with private companies, it was important 
that civil servants knew more about business economics. 
xiv A.E.C. Saarloos, Ingenieur of Accountant, in: Accountancy, jrg. 16, nr. 178, 1918, pp. 119 
xv See for example: Inaugural address of N.J. Polak, Het huidige stadium en naaste taak der 
bedrijfsleer, 17 January 1922 at the Handelshogeschool of Rotterdam. 
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